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Abstract
We add the Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist model to a world model consisting of the US, the Euro-
zone and the Rest of the World in order to explore the causes of the banking crisis. We test the model
against linear-detrended data and reestimate it by indirect inference; the resulting model passes the
Wald test only on outputs in the two countries. We then extract the models implied residuals on
unltered data to replicate how the model predicts the crisis. Banking shocks worsen the crisis but
traditional shocks explain the bulk of the crisis; the non-stationarity of the productivity shocks
plays a key role. Crises occur when there is a run of bad shocks; based on this sample Great
Recessions occur on average once every quarter century. Financial shocks on their own, even when
extreme, do not cause crises  provided the government acts swiftly to counteract such a shock as
happened in this sample.
1 Introduction
Since the banking crisis controversy has surrounded available macroeconomic models. They have been
criticised for failing to predict the crisis. While clearly the models imply that it is impossible to predict
crises, one might consider this to be a strength rather than a weakness since if it were possible to predict
such a crisis, then it would surely have been widely predicted (and no doubt thus avoided). Thus models
seem in this respect to mirror the actual situation. Nevertheless they did fail  much more seriously 
to predict the possibility of crisis because they contained no mechanisms that could produce it. Thus they
had no banking sector, so that a fortiori no banking crisis could occur. Furthermore they embodied only
stationary shocks so that permanent shocks to the level of trend output, such as appear to characterise
crisis episodes, were not examined; true, in the background there was possibly a non-stationary trend in
productivity (typically removed by ltering from the model data) but there was not much focus on this
in practice. A further issue concerns their ability to t the facts; economists such as Heckman 1 have
attacked the lack of empirical content in macro models, implying that it is hardly surprising they could
give little guidance to policy in the crisis.
Le, Meenagh and Minford (2012) addressed these issues within a model of the US. Here we address
them, using essentially the same procedures, within a worldeconomy model, in which we link a model
of the US with a model of the euro-area (EA) and add a trade bloc for the Rest of the World. This wider
e¤ort seems worthwhile since the crisis was international in scope. We build on recent work in various
ways. The model incorporates monetary linkages that can be thought of as a form of informal policy
coordination; these have been found by Hong and Minford (2012) to greatly improve the t of the model
to the data and incidentally reduce the improbable orthogonalityfound by Le, Meenagh, Minford and
Wickens (Le et al, 2010) between the US and the EA under monetary independence. We also integrate
the familiar Bernanke et al (1999) banking sector model into the widely-used Smets-Wouters-style DSGE
model (as adapted by Le et al, 2011) for each economy. We test the model unconditionally against the
data and re-estimate it to enable it to t as closely as possible; this is important as it ensures that the
Tamas Csaba provided research assistance for which we are grateful. Zhirong Ou also sends his special thanks to
Hangkin Hui for useful discussions.
yCorresponding author: B14, Aberconway building, Cardi¤ Business School, Colum Drive, Cardi¤ , UK, CF10 3EU.
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1. . . Macroeconomics is not a science, its a patchwork of theorems and bad data. There is little serious work on the
subject, which seems dominated by beliefs(Heckman, 2010, interview in The Observer)
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Figure 1: US/EA output: trend and volume
origins of the shocks are accurately measured and their e¤ects not exaggerated. Finally, we then apply
it to unltered data to extract the potentially non-stationary shocks the model implies, and use these to
give an account of what produced this banking crisis, relating this nding to the current policy debate.
Since the crisis, much work has been done to incorporate a banking sector into DSGE models. The
banking models involve a friction in the intermediation process based on Townsends (1979) costly state
verication set-up so that the interest margin required reects the risk of loan default. This risk varies
with the state of the economy because the willingness of the private sector to invest and therefore borrow
varies directly with the expected return on capital. The exact transmission between the state and the
risk-premium di¤ers across the various banking models that have been proposed but that of Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) has been designed to capture many of the common features of these models;
it is their set-up that we therefore use here as a representative one. In it, the IS curve now includes a
variable risk-premium which is related to the economic state. We examine the empirical performance
of this model and establish how far the banking element contributes to the overall explanation of crisis
episodes.
We use the method of indirect inference in preference to Bayesian or Maximum Likelihood methods
of testing and estimation because we have found in recent work (Le et al., 2012) that the Wald test in
indirect inference has considerably greater power than the equivalent tests available with these other
methods in testing the whole model against the data. Thus we use the Wald test to allow the data to
reject potential models as a whole and we then use a powerful Simulated Annealing algorithm to search
over the models permissible parameter range for the set that gets closest to the data behaviour.
An important element in crisisepisodes is the permanence of crisis shocks. The graphs of US and EA
show rather clearly how output has collapsed below the old trend line and shows little sign of reverting
to it. This also seems to have occurred after the Great Depression in the US and after the oil crisis of the
mid-1970s in most western economies. Thus the trend level seems to take a permanent hit in these crisis
episodes. Furthermore the same appears to be true in reverse for periods of strong growth, such as the
US in the late 90s and early 2000s; the output trend in these periods gets shifted upwards permanently.
This suggests that the productivity and perhaps other shocks hitting the economy are non-stationary.
Hence here our aim is to model the economy under potentially nonstationary shocks.
While the banking crisis originated in the US, it spread to the rest of the world rapidly; thus our
model here is for a worldthat consists of two main economies, the US and the EA, with a third Rest
of the World sector which picks up trade ows of the two main continents with other countries, so that
the model spans world trade. For each continental economy our strategy is to take the well-known and
empirically relatively successful models built by Smets and Wouters (2007, 2003, SW), and add to each
the banking model due to Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999, BGG). Variants of the combination
of SW and BGG have been used in recent papers by Christiano, Motto & Rostagno (2010) for the
US and Eurozone separately; Gilchrist et al. (2009) for the US alone and Fahr et al (2011) for the
Eurozone alone. They nd that shocks that come from the nancial sector have an important role in
explaining macroeconomic uctuations. All these authors use the Bayesian approach to estimating the
model parameters. We modify the Smets-Wouters set-up along the lines set out in Le et al (2011) by
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allowing for a competitive sector in both the labour and the product markets; this modication allows
the models to t the data behaviour better, reecting the great variability across sectors in price and
wage exibility as noted by Dixon and coauthors (eg Dixon and Kara, 2012). We also follow the recent
work of Hong and Minford (2012) in which evidence is found of monetary reactions by both the US Fed
and EAs central bank(s) to each others policies- this is modelled as a reaction by each to the US/EA
real exchange rate.
What distinguishes our work from other recent papers modelling the crisis is three main things. First,
we use a world model, whereas previous work uses models of individual countries; we hope in this way
to pick up the global reach of the crisis. Second, we make the models pass an empirical hurdle of tting
the data behaviour overall on the indirect inference test. If, as we nd, the original (calibrated or more
often Bayesian) parameters do not pass the test, we search for parameters that get closest to the data
according to this test; and we only nally use a parameter set that passes the test for the variables we
want to explain. We think this empirical hurdle is necessary in this particular area because while it is
possible to construct models that generate large nancial accelerator e¤ects by suitable choice of priors,
the parameter sets that get closest to an overall t to the data do not give anywhere near such large
e¤ects; it seems they cannot be found in the data. Third, we use this estimated model to extract the
true residuals from the original unltered data. While we are forced by currently available technology to
estimate the model on data that has been linear-detrended to make it stationary, we nd it is crucial in
accounting for the crisis to include all the data and hence also the full residuals, with their non-stationary
elements.
The paper is organised as follows. We begin in section 2 by giving a brief account of the model. In
section 3 we examine the results of empirical tests of the model with its original calibrated or Bayesian
coe¢ cients; we then re-estimate it to obtain the version that gets closest to the data; this is done on
stationary data, for which testing and estimation methods are fully developed. In section 4, we apply
the model as re-estimated to the original unltered data and consider what light it sheds on the causes
of this banking crisis as well as of crises and banking crises in general. Section 5 concludes and draws
out some implications for policy.
2 The SW and BGG models
2.1 The SW model of the US and EA economy
The SW models of the US and EA (2003, 2007) follow the specication of Christiano et al (2005) which
itself marked a major development in macroeconometric modelling based on DSGE models. Their main
aim is to construct and estimate a DSGE model in which prices and wages, and hence real wages, are
sticky due to nominal and real frictions arising from Calvo pricing in both the goods and labour markets,
and to examine the consequent e¤ects of monetary policy which is set through a Taylor rule. It may
be said, therefore, to be a New Keynesian model. In deciding the model coe¢ cients SW combine both
calibration and Bayesian estimation methods on post-war quarterly data.
Smets and Wouters made various tests of their models. Subsequently Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets
and Wouters (2007, DSSW) further examined the US model by considering the extent to which its re-
strictions help to explain the data. Estimating the SW model using Bayesian methods, they approximate
it by a VAR in vector error-correction form and compare this with an unrestricted VAR tted to actual
data that ignores cross-equation restrictions. They introduce a hyperparameter  to measure the relative
weights of the two VARs. b is chosen to maximise the marginal likelihood of the combined models given
the priors. DSSW nd that this estimate of  is a reasonable distance away from  = 0, its value when
the restrictions are ignored, but is also far away from  = 1, its value when the SW restrictions are
correct. Even though this is not a test, it is consistent with what we nd with our formal Wald test,
that the US model is rejected strongly by the data behaviour.
A key respect in which the model can be modied to t the data better is to allow for variations in
the degree of price and wage rigidity across sectors. In further work on the US, Le et al (2011) proposed
a hybrid model that merged the NK and NC models by assuming that wage and price setters nd
themselves supplying labour and intermediate output partly in a competitive market with price/wage
exibility, and partly in a market with imperfect competition. The price and wage setting equations in
the hybrid model are assumed to be a weighted average of the corresponding NK and NC equations; this
is similar to including many Calvo sectorsof di¤erent degrees of rigidity as in Dixon and Kara (2012).
Essentially, the NK model tends to generate too little nominal variation while the NC model delivers
too much. However the hybrid model was able to reproduce the variances of the data; and it is this key
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feature that enables it to match the data overall more closely. It is this hybridversion of the SW model
that we adopt here for both the US and EA models. To the two-country set-up we add trade spillovers
to and from the Rest of the World, to ensure that world trade ows carefully accounted for. Finally, we
follow the recent work of Hong and Minford (2012) in which evidence is found of monetary reactions by
both the US Fed and EAs central bank(s) to each others policies- this is modelled as a reaction by each
to the US/EA real exchange rate.
2.2 The BGG model of the banking sector together with the SW model
The BGG nancial sector produces certain changes in the model of Smets and Wouters (2007) in the form
used here as modied by Le et al. (2011) but much remains unchanged. The key di¤erence in BGG lies
in the nature of entrepreneurs. They still produce intermediate goods, but now they do not rent capital
from households (who do not buy capital but only buy bonds or deposits) but must buy it from capital
producers and in order to buy this capital they have to borrow from a bank which converts household
savings into lending; the terms of this borrowing are set by a contract governed by the costly state
verication set-up of Townsend (1979). On their production side, entrepreneurs face the same situation
as in Le et al. (2011). They hire labour from households for wages that are partly set in monopolistic,
partly in competitive labour markets; and they buy capital from capital producers at prices of goods
similarly set in a mixture of monopolistic and competitive goods markets. Thus the production function,
the labour demand and real marginal cost equations are unchanged. It is on their nancing side that
there are major changes. Entrepreneurs buy capital using their own net worth, pledged against loans
from the bank, which thus intermediates household savings deposited with it at the risk-free rate of
return. The net worth of entrepreneurs is kept below the demand for capital by a xed death rate of
these rms (1 ); the stock of rms is kept constant by an equal birth rate of new rms. Entrepreneurial
net worth therefore is given by the past net worth of surviving rms plus their total return on capital
minus the expected return (which is paid out in borrowing costs to the bank) on the externally nanced
part of their capital stock  equivalent to
nwt = nwt 1 +
K
N
(rext   Et 1rext ) + Et 1rext + enwt (1)
where KN is the steady state ratio of capital expenditures to entrepreneurial net worth and  is the
survival rate of entrepreneurs. Those who die will consume their net worth, so that entrepreneurial
consumption is equal to (1   ) times net worth. In logs this implies that this consumption varies in
proportion to net worth so that:
cet = nwt (2)
In order to borrow, entrepreneurs have to sign a debt contract prior to the realisation of idiosyncratic
shocks on the return to capital: they choose their total capital and the associated borrowing before the
shock realisation. The optimal debt contract takes a state-contingent form to ensure that the expected
gross return on the banks lending is equal to the bank opportunity cost of lending. When the idiosyn-
cratic shock hits, there is a critical threshold for it such that for shock values above the threshold, the
entrepreneur repays the loan and keeps the surplus, while for values below it, he would default, with the
bank keeping whatever is available. From the rst order conditions of the optimal contract, the external
nance premium is equated with the expected marginal product of capital which under constant returns
to scale is exogenous to the individual rm (and given by the exogenous technology parameter); hence
the capital stock of each entrepreneur is proportional to his net worth, with this proportion increasing as
the expected marginal product rises, driving up the external nance premium. Thus the external nance
premium increases with the amount of the rms capital investment that is nanced by borrowing:
Etr
ex
t+1   (Rt   Ett+1) = (Qt + kt   nwt) + eprt (3)
where the coe¢ cient  > 0 measures the elasticity of the premium with respect to leverage. Entre-
preneurs leverage up to the point where the expected return on capital equals the cost of borrowing from
nancial intermediaries. The external nance premium also depends on an exogenous premium shock,
eprt. This can be thought of as a shock to the supply of credit: that is, a change in the e¢ ciency of the
nancial intermediation process, or a shock to the nancial sector that alters the premium beyond what
is dictated by the current economic and policy conditions.
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Entrepreneurs buy capital at price Qt in period t and uses it in (t+ 1) production. At (t+ 1)
entrepreneurs receive the marginal product of capital rkt+1 and the ex-post aggregate return to capital is
rext+1: The capital arbitrage equation (Tobins Q equation) becomes:
Qt =
1  
1  us +Rk
EtQt+1 +
Rk
1  us +Rk
Etr
k
t+1   Etrext+1 (4)
The resulting investment by entrepreneurs is therefore reacting to a Q-ratio that includes the e¤ect of
the risk-premium. There are as before investment adjustment costs. Thus, the investment Euler equation
and capital accumulation equations are unchanged from Le et al. (2011). The output market-clearing
condition now includes the consumption of entrepreneurs.
This completes our brief account of the model we are using here. A full listing is given in the
Appendix.
3 Testing the model
3.1 The method of indirect inference
We evaluate the modelscapacity in tting the data using the method of Indirect Inference originally
proposed in Minford, Theodoridis and Meenagh (2009) and subsequently with a number of renements
by Le et al. (2011) who evaluate the method using Monte Carlo experiments. The approach employs
an auxiliary model that is completely independent of the theoretical one to produce a description of
the data against which the performance of the theory is evaluated indirectly. Such a description can
be summarised either by the estimated parameters of the auxiliary model or by functions of these; we
will call these the descriptors of the data. While these are treated as the reality, the theoretical model
being evaluated is simulated to nd its implied values for them.
Indirect inference has been widely used in the estimation of structural models (e.g., Smith, 1993,
Gregory and Smith, 1991, 1993, Gourieroux et al., 1993, Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995 and Canova,
2005). Here we make a further use of indirect inference, to evaluate an already estimated or calibrated
structural model. The common element is the use of an auxiliary time series model. In estimation
the parameters of the structural model are chosen such that when this model is simulated it generates
estimates of the auxiliary model similar to those obtained from the actual data. The optimal choices of
parameters for the structural model are those that minimise the distance between a given function of
the two sets of estimated coe¢ cients of the auxiliary model. Common choices of this function are the
actual coe¢ cients, the scores or the impulse response functions. In model evaluation the parameters of
the structural model are taken as given. The aim is to compare the performance of the auxiliary model
estimated on simulated data derived from the given estimates of a structural model which is taken as
a true model of the economy, the null hypothesis  with the performance of the auxiliary model when
estimated from the actual data. If the structural model is correct then its predictions about the impulse
responses, moments and time series properties of the data should statistically match those based on the
actual data. The comparison is based on the distributions of the two sets of parameter estimates of the
auxiliary model, or of functions of these estimates.
The testing procedure thus involves rst constructing the errors implied by the previously esti-
mated/calibrated structural model and the data. These are called the structural errors and are backed
out directly from the equations and the data2 . These errors are then bootstrapped and used to generate
for each bootstrap new data based on the structural model. An auxiliary time series model is then tted
to each set of data and the sampling distribution of the coe¢ cients of the auxiliary time series model is
obtained from these estimates of the auxiliary model. A Wald statistic is computed to determine whether
functions of the parameters of the time series model estimated on the actual data lie in some condence
interval implied by this sampling distribution.
In the case of the large three-country model here we examine a variety of variable sets, in a VAR(1)
inclusive of their variances. to establish the capacity of the model to replicate data behaviour. The
fullest set contains output, ination and interest rates for both the US and the EA, plus the real US/EA
exchange rate. We examine a large number of subsets of these also, with the smallest being the real
exchange rate on its own. The Wald statistic is computed for each set, in total and separately for the
2Some equations may involve calculation of expectations. The method we use here is the robust instrumental variables
estimation suggested by McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982): we set the lagged endogenous data as instruments and
calculate the tted values from a VAR(1) this also being the auxiliary model chosen in what follows.
5
VAR coe¢ cients and the data variances3 . Thus e¤ectively we are testing whether the observed dynamics
and volatility of the chosen variables are explained by the simulated joint distribution of these at a given
condence level. The Wald statistic is given by:
(  )0
X 1
()
(  ) (5)
where  is the vector of VAR estimates of the chosen descriptors yielded in each simulation, with  andP
() representing the corresponding sample means and variance-covariance matrix of these calculated
across simulations, respectively.
The joint distribution of the  is obtained by bootstrapping the innovations implied by the data and
the theoretical model; it is therefore an estimate of the small sample distribution4 . Such a distribution
is generally more accurate for small samples than the asymptotic distribution; it is also shown to be
consistent by Le et al. (2011) given that the Wald statistic is asymptotically pivotal; they also showed
it had quite good accuracy in small sample Monte Carlo experiments5 .
This testing procedure is applied to a set of (structural) parameters put forward as the true ones
(H0, the null hypothesis); they can be derived from calibration, estimation, or both. However derived,
the test then asks: could these coe¢ cients within this model structure be the true (numerical) model
generating the data? Of course only one true model with one set of coe¢ cients is possible. Nevertheless
we may have chosen coe¢ cients that are not exactly right numerically, so that the same model with
other coe¢ cient values could be correct. Only when we have examined the model with all coe¢ cient
values that are feasible within the model theory will we have properly tested it. For this reason we later
extend our procedure by a further search algorithm, in which we seek other coe¢ cient sets that could
do better in the test.
Thus we calculate the minimum-value full Wald statistic for each period using a powerful algorithm
based on Simulated Annealing (SA) in which search takes place over a wide range around the initial
values, with optimising search accompanied by random jumps around the space6 . In e¤ect this is In-
direct Estimation of the model; however here this estimation is being done to nd whether the model
can be rejected in itself and not for the sake of nding the most satisfactory estimates of the model
parameters. Nevertheless of course the method does this latter task as a by-product so that we can use
the resulting unrejected model as representing the best available estimated version. The merit of this
extended procedure is that we are comparing the best possible versions of each model type when nally
doing our comparison of model compatibility with the data.
3.2 Tests of the model
What we nd from our testing procedure is fairly encouraging for the model, considering that it is an
ambitious undertaking to replicate the joint behaviour of two large continents. As we will see, it is
possible to do so only to a limited extent with the current specications embedded in the model. Plainly,
this opens up a challenging research agenda for open economy macroeconomics. But it is at least useful
to know just in what features particularly the model fails.
We begin by testing the model with the original Bayesian estimates of SW for the US and EA models
on their own, plus banking parameters for both continents taken from the US version of the model with
banking. The model is strongly rejected with this parameter set. Just how bad the failures are is shown
in the rst column of table 1.
3Note that the VAR impulse response functions, the co-variances, as well as the auto/cross correlations of the left-hand-
side variables will all be implicitly examined when the VAR coe¢ cient matrix is considered, since the former are functions
of the latter.
4The bootstraps in our tests are all drawn as time vectors so contemporaneous correlations between the innovations are
preserved.
5Specically, they found that the bias due to bootstrapping was just over 2% at the 95% condence level and 0.6%
at the 99% level. They suggested possible further renements in the bootstrapping procedure which could increase the
accuracy further; however, we do not feel it necessary to pursue these here.
6We use a Simulated Annealing algorithm due to Ingber (1996). This mimics the behaviour of the steel cooling process
in which steel is cooled, with a degree of reheating at randomly chosen moments in the cooling process this ensuring that
the defects are minimised globally. Similarly the algorithm searches in the chosen range and as points that improve the
objective are found it also accepts points that do not improve the objective. This helps to stop the algorithm being caught in
local minima. We nd this algorithm improves substantially here on a standard optimisation algorithm. Our method used
our standard testing method: we take a set of model parameters (excluding error processes), extract the resulting residuals
from the data using the LIML method, nd their implied autoregressive coe¢ cients (AR(1) here) and then bootstrap the
implied innovations with this full set of parameters to nd the implied Wald value. This is then minimised by the SA
algorithm.
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Figure 2: Model IRFs to a Monetary Shock (row1: US shock; row2 EA shock)
Using the Simulated Annealing algorithm, we are able to nd a parameter set that gets a lot closer
to the data, even though it is still rejected overall by a set of 7 key macro variables output, ination,
interest rates and the euro/dollar real exchange rate. While it can jointly match the volatility in this
set and all subsets of these except the interest rates pair, it cannot at all match its dynamics and hence
its overall behaviour. We can only nd a much narrower subset for which the model achieves an overall
match to behaviour- viz. output in the US and the EA. The model cannot match the behaviour of the
two ination rates or the two interest rates, though it does get quite a lot closer than for the full 7. We
show these results in full in table 1 while the Simulated Annealing estimates in tables 2 and 3 (other
xed parameters are shown in table 4); these are the estimates we use in what follows. Of course for
an even wider set of variables including consumption or investment, not shown here, the model is very
severely rejected, as generally found with such models- for an example of such results see Le et al (2010)
and also Le, Minford and Wickens (2010) in which the results for a US-EA model similar that of Chari
et al (2002) are reviewed. While individual features of the data can be matched, they cannot be matched
jointly. It seems that the failure of the world model to match the data may well lie essentially in its
failure to match EA data- thus Meenagh et al (2009) found that they could not match the behaviour
of the EA at all well when features are considered jointly. This is in contrast to Le et al (2011) who
found that with reestimation by simulated annealing they could match the behaviour of key US variables
jointly.
The conclusion of this reestimation process is that we can match the two continentsoutput behaviour
with this model and therefore it is worthy of further interrogation, to discover what it implies about the
sources and nature of the crisis for output- for other variables we should not take the implications too
seriously. We show in a spirit of illustration the impulse response functions for US and EA monetary
shocks- gure 2. As we have seen these are not reliable empirically except for outputs, but it is of some
interest to see what the best-tting model of this type that we can nd implies for the other responses.
In particular we see that there are substantial spill-overs in the model from the US onto the EA though
little in the opposite direction.
7Note for shocks to government spending we have followed Smet and Wouters (2007) to assume
"g;t= i"g;t 1+vg;t+ava;t so productivity is both a supply and a demand shock.
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yEAt ,R
EA
t ; st
100
(170.4)
100
(24.1)
100
(25.8)
64.1
(-0.25)
USt ,R
US
t
EAt ,R
EA
t ,s
100
(244.6)
100
(27.8)
100
(30.4)
68.5
(-0.11)
yUSt ,
US
t ,y
EA
t ,
EA
t
100
(17.0)
100
(11.1)
100
(11.0)
67.7
(-0.19)
yUSt ,R
US
t ,y
EA
t ,R
EA
t
100
(16.1)
100
(10.2)
100
(10.6)
72.5
(-0.07)
USt ,R
US
t ,
EA
t ,R
EA
t
100
(14.1)
100
(34.1)
100
(36.6)
77.0
(0.11)
yUSt ,y
EA
t ,st
100
(138.7)
100
(11.0)
100
(10.3)
77.8
(0.06)
USt ,
EA,st
100
(138.9)
100
(10.8)
100
(10.5)
75.2
(-0.07)
RUSt ,R
EA,st
100
(133.8)
100
(10.6)
100
(10.8)
56.2
(-0.49)
yUSt ,y
EA
t
95.5
(0.71)
84.2
(0.69)
60.1
(-0.20)
85.6
(0.36)
USt ,
EA 100
(12.8)
100
(11.6)
100
(11.8)
83.4
(0.28)
RUSt ,R
EA 100
(25.8)
100
(24.2)
100
(13.9)
100
(25.3)
st
94.1
(1.49)
99.9
(5.39)
100
(8.28)
87.2
(0.08)
Table 1: Comparing the ModelsFit to the Data (1973Q1-2010Q4)
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US model EA model
Main equ.
parameters
Start
values
SA
estimates
Main equ.
parameters
Start
values
SA
estimates
hus 0.71 0.68 hEA 0.55 0.64
usc 1.40 1.12 
EA
c 1.61 1.80
'US 5.74 5.29 'EA 7 6.49
USrk n.a 0.86 
EA
rk n.a 0.73
USp 0.24 0.28 
EA
p 0.43 0.31
USp 0.66 0.96 
EA
p 0.91 0.72
USp 1.6 1.61 
EA
p 1.49 1.92
US 0.19 0.15 EA 0.3 0.23
USw n.a 0.68 
EA
w n.a 0.23
USw 0.58 0.64 
EA
w 0.66 0.87
USw 0.7 0.61 
EA
w 0.76 0.57
USl 1.83 1.94 
EA
l 1.19 1.35
 US 0.54 0.75  EA 0.85 0.21
US 0.81 0.51 EA 0.93 0.76
US 2.03 1.27 
EA
 1.66 2.94
USy 0.08 0.07 
EA
y 0.14 0.14
USMy 0.22 0.22 
EA
My -0.17 -0.19
US 0.05 0.06 EA 0.05 0.02
US1 n.a 3.11 
EA
1 n.a 0.28
US2 n.a 3.40 
EA
2 n.a 0.40
US xed 0.025 EAM 0.22 0.16
US xed 1.0043 EA xed 1
"p xed 10  xed 0.8
"w xed 10 
EA xed 0.025
USw xed 1.5 w xed 0.596
USnw xed 0.9 
EA
nw xed 0.9
Table 2: Simulated Annealing Estimates of the US-EA-World Model (1973Q1-2010Q4)
US model EA model
"i;t= i"i;t 1+vi;t+ivi;t 1
USb 0.28 
EA
b 0.38
USi 0.51 
EA
i 0.21
USpi
(USpi )
0.67
(-0.57)
EApi
(EApi )
0.96
(-0.55)
USa 0.96 
EA
a 0.99
USw
(USw )
0.90
(-0.68)
EAw
(EAw )
0.99
(-0.80)
USwNC
(USwNC)
0.98
(-0.03)
EAwNC
(EAwNC)
0.99
(-0.02)
USg
(USa )
7
0.81
(0.22)
EAg
(EAa )
0.99
(1.04)
USR 0.55 
EA
R 0.57
USpr 0.83 
EA
pr 0.95
USnw -0.05 
EA
nw 0.42
Table 3: Estimated Evolution Process of Shocks (1973Q1-2010Q4)
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Rk;us 0.0326 R
k;ea
 0.04
Cus
Y us 0.54
Cea
Y ea 0.57
Ius
Y us 0.12
Iea
Y ea 0.21
IMea
Y us 0.0032
IMus
Y ea 0.0212
IMus
Y us 0.0042
IMea
Y ea 0.0172
EXusw
Y us 0.0115
EXeaw
Y ea 0.205
IMusw
Y us 0.0183
IMeaw
Y ea 0.207
Ce;us
Y us 0.11
Ce;ea
Y ea 0.012
Kus
Y us 0.12
Kus
Nus 1.1214
Kea
Nea 1.27
IMusw
Y w 0.31
IMeaw
Y w 0.69
 0.99
Table 4: Other xed parameters of the US-EA-World Model (1973Q1-2010Q4)
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Figure 3: VAR(1) IRFs to a Monetary Shock (row1: US shock; row2: EA shock)
Given that it passes the Wald test for the two outputs VAR(1), it generates 95% condence limits for
implied VAR responses that easily encompass the data-based VAR responses to key shocks for these two
variables; in gure 3 we show the monetary shock VAR IRFs and the model 95% bounds as an example.
Some authors have wanted to assess a model solely on whether it could t the VAR IRFs (eg Christiano
et al, 2005, assessed their model of the US solely on the t to the monetary shock IRFs). One can thus
think of our Wald test on the VAR coe¢ cients for the two outputs as assessing the model on the basis
of all the shock IRFs for the two outputs.
4 What does the model say about the origins of the banking
crisis?
Having established a model that integrates the banking sector and ts the data at least to a limited
extent, we now go on to apply it to the recent crisis episode in the US, the EA and the ROW. To do this
we extract the model shocks from the unltered data and t to each an ARMA time-series process over
the sample period. Figures 4 and 5 show these shock series.
Table 5 shows the order of integration of each shock according to two widely-used tests and also the
ARMA parameters. Several of the shocks show evidence of a one-o¤ structural break. In the US the
wage mark-up and competitive wage (labour supply) move downwards sharply in the 1990s; this could
be related to the labour supply reforms of US administrations in the 1980s and the rise of globalisation
which together led to large falls in labour union power. In the EA the Taylor Rule setting of interest rates
rose sharply in the early 1980s; we associate this with the toughening of monetary policy at this time
across the EA, in parallel with similar toughening in the US and the UK. In the EA this was achieved by
linkage of other countries to the Deutschemark through the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. There
are also downward movements in the external nance premium and the price mark-up during much the
same period, which may well be associated with increasing product market competition as the Single
Market began to be introduced. We allow for these shifts by a single dummy variable in each case and
test the adjusted error in the table below. The steady upward movements of the wage mark-up and the
competitive wage (labour supply) may be associated with intensifying Social Market intervention in the
labour market, more trendlike behaviour than a one-o¤ shift.
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Figure 4: US Structural Errors (1973Q2-2010Q3)
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Figure 5: EA Structural Errors (1973Q2-2010Q3)
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The tests conict in several cases. A signicant KPSS indicates rejection of stationarity whereas a
low ADF p-value rejects non-stationarity. For US productivity the tests both suggest nonstationarity.
For EA productivity the same is true. US investment and net worth are ambivalent but their ADFs very
strongly reject the unit root and their AR roots are well inside the unit circle. All other US errors are
clearly stationary on both tests. The other EA errors are ambiguous in four cases; government spending,
labour supply, the wage mark-up and net worth. In all of them however the ADFs strongly reject the
unit root and the AR roots are below unity so we treat them all as stationary, with or without a trend.
Ultimately, with more work on testing and estimation we could determine the optimal status of the
more ambiguous errors based on the overall model match to the data; in other work we have found that
with borderline errors, making them non-stationary worsens the overall match. Here we have limited the
assumption of non-stationarity to productivity in both US and EA. However as can be seen from the
table above of estimated parameters the stationary EA errors are mostly very close to the unit root.
ADF
p-value+
KPSS
statistic
AR(1)
coe¤.
MA(1)
coe¤.
Conclusion
US (1973Q2-2010Q3)
Government
spending
0.0121 0.1181 0.88 -0.23 Trend stationary
Preferences 0.0000 0.1369 0.46 -0.25 Stationary
Investment 0.0000 0.8185

0.62 -0.28 Stationary
Taylor Rule 0.0022 0.2123 0.92 -0.57 Stationary
Productivity 0.9997 1.4363

1.01 0.09 Nonstationary
Price mark-up 0.0000 0.0583 0.50 -0.48 Stationary
Wage mark-up
(imperfectly compet.)
0.0000 0.3656 0.96 -0.78 Stationary{
Labour supply
(competitive wage)
0.1831 0.3991 0.99 -0.04 Stationary{
External premium 0.0102 0.1751 0.82 0.06 Stationary
Net worth 0.0000 1.0783

-0.20 0.23 Stationary
EA (1973Q2-2010Q3)
Government
spending
0.0010 1.3451

0.98 0.32 Stationary
Preferences 0.0027 0.0585 0.86 -0.61 Stationary{{
Investment 0.0000 0.0431 0.55 -0.53 Stationary{{
Taylor Rule 0.0000 0.0887 0.72 -0.42 Stationary{{{
Productivity 0.1063 1.4209

0.99 0.26 Nonstationary
Price mark-up 0.0007 0.2128 0.94 -0.73 Stationary{{{
Wage mark-up
(imperfectly compet.)
0.0004 1.2808

0.98 -0.89 Stationary
Labour supply
(competitive wage)
0.0020 1.2702

0.98 -0.38 Stationary
External premium 0.0004 0.1592 0.90 0.18 Stationary{{{
Net worth 0.0000 0.2417

0.74 -0.37 Trend stationary
+: p-value of 0.05 is the 5% condence limit for rejecting the unit root.
: rejection of stationarity at 1%.
{({{)({{{): break dummy at 1996 (1993) (1984)- all in Q1.
Table 5: Stationarity of Structural Errors (1970Q2-2010Q3)
4.1 The errors driving the episode
We begin by showing the behaviour of the main model errors (i.e. the total cumulated innovations) during
the crisis episode, which we treat as 2006Q1 to 2009Q2. We have not included the recovery periodat
this stage, though this would be interesting; our focus is on the period when the world economy rst
went into recession and then bottomed out. Of course for the EA the government solvency crisis that
followed the world banking crisis began in 2010 and is not yet over. However, we may consider this to be
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Figure 6: US Accumulated Innovations (2006Q1-2009Q2)
a separate crisis of the euro-zone itself, even if it was triggered by the banking crisis. We do not consider
it here.
What is striking about the two sets of shocks for the crisis period is how di¤erent they are in most
cases between the two continents (tables 6 and 7). In the US the external nance premium shock peaks
in the Lehman collapse in 2008 Q4, whereas in the EA it peaks early in 2008 reecting the general
banking problems connected with sub-prime mortgage products. The other banking shock, to net worth,
uctuates in the US, dropping sharply after the Lehman collapse, while in the EA it drops steadily from
the start of the crisis; both recover in 2009.
In the US productivity rises from early 2007 whereas in the EA it declines steadily throughout
the crisis. In the US government spending rises at the start of the episode and then attens o¤ until
Lehman, whereas in the EA it rises strongly but falls from late 2008. In both continents the price mark-
up uctuates, reecting commodity price movements. The Taylor Rule error rises in 2008 in both the
US and the EA, because of the zero lower bound we assume. For three errors however the reactions are
the same: in both the US and the EA there was a large rise in the competitive wage error, reecting the
failure of real wages to fall as much as the model equation suggests, and in both continents there was a
fall in the consumer and investment errors (condencee¤ects).
We rst use these errors to establish a general variance decomposition. This analysis treats the
episode stochastically  that is, we take the shocks in the episode and replay them by redrawing them
randomly and repeatedly with replacement to see what a typical crisis episode would be like. Our
variance decomposition is therefore for such a typical episode- table 6.
We are particularly interested in whether banking shocks(which we dene as the external nance
premium and the net worth shocks) were mainly responsible for the output e¤ects. Here we nd that for
the US banking shocks (of US origin) are responsible for about a third of the output variance; and for the
EA it is a similar 40% (all of it EA in origin). The model also implies that the EA was greatly a¤ected
by the general recession during the crisis, with virtually no spill-over from the US. As for US output,
non-banking shocks contributed two thirds of its variance, with roughly half of that contribution coming
from the EA. Thus while banking is important for the world as a whole, the dominant contributor to the
crisis period is non-banking shocks. This, as we noted at the start, is similar to the nding of Stock and
Watson (2012), using dynamic factor VAR methods, that there was nothing particularly di¤erent about
this crisis from previous US macro behaviour, other than the size of the shock draws.
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Figure 7: EA Accumulated Innovations (2006Q1-2009Q2)
If we turn to interest rate and ination variances we nd that there are large spillovers from the EA
to the US but much less from the US to the EA. Banking shocks are the dominant contributor to the
variance of both variables in both continents. The model is not accurate on these variables so these
results need to be regarded cautiously. However, it is plausible that these two continents were strongly
linked in monetary reactions during the crisis.
4.2 Accounting for this particular banking crisis episode
We can also decompose what actually happened in the precise episode that occurred according to the
model as a result of these shocks. We do this in the charts that follow for US and EA output.
We see (gure 8) how the model suggests the crisis period shocks drove US output down nearly 7%
between 2008Q3 and 2009Q2. The main sources of this were large swings in net worth (dark blue),
investment (light blue) and consumer (red) shocks. The rst, banking shock, contributed 2% of the
total, just under a third; the other two contributed about 4%. In addition there was a miscellany of
shocks from the EA, contributing the remaining 1%.
For the EA (gure 9) the crisis period shocks drove output down by just under 5% over the same
period. EA labour supply and productivity shocks each contributed 2%; worsening investment shock
another 2% and declining government spending another 1%. However this total decline of some 7% was
o¤set by a quick improvement in the external nance premium, net of a worsening net worth shock; thus
the banking shocks by mid 2009 had pushed EA output up by 2% compared with mid-2008. Thus the
EA su¤ered from the crisis of late 2008 almost as severely as the US, but the causes of this were not
directly from its own banking problems (the euro-zone banking and sovereign crisis was to come later),
rather they were from general non-banking sources.
The overall interpretation coming from this analysis is of a crisis triggered by severe exogenous shocks,
and exacerbated by a large nancial shock in the US. Plainly from the timing of the output collapse these
shocks were associated with the collapse of Lehman; thus it might be that, had Lehman not been allowed
to collapse, these shocks would not have occurred. However, since the shocks all came from di¤erent
sources, even if their timing was coordinated, this would not imply that the Lehman collapse caused
these shocks and so the overall crisis; they could just as well have all happened in an uncoordinated way
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Unit (%) Int. rate Ination Output Int. rate Ination Output
(US) (EA)
(US)
Government
spending
0.9 2.9 22.4 1.9 1.9 0.0
Preferences 0.1 0.2 3.1 0.2 0.2 0.0
Investment 0.0 0.1 2.5 0.3 0.3 0.0
Taylor Rule 0.8 1.6 3.2 5.0 5.6 0.0
Productivity 4.5 10.5 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.0
Price mark-up 0.3 6.1 1.6 0.4 0.4 0.0
Wage mark-up
(Imperfectly compet.)
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Labour supply
(Competitive wage)
0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
External premium 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Net worth 4.3 10.6 34.8 4.8 4.9 0.0
(EA)
Government
spending
0.5 0.6 0.5 4.9 4.0 14.9
Preferences 1.9 0.8 1.1 2.3 5.7 0.1
Investment 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.6
Taylor Rule 9.3 3.3 6.0 6.5 19.5 0.1
Productivity 33.9 21.7 12.8 23.2 26.7 29.5
Price mark-up 20.0 14.8 5.6 24.2 19.7 4.7
Wage mark-up
(Imperfectly compet.)
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Labour supply
(Competitive wage)
21.2 23.2 1.7 16.8 6.0 10.5
External premium 1.1 1.9 2.6 7.1 3.4 28.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Banking
shocks
(US)
(EA)
4.4
2.0
10.6
2.8
34.9
3.1
4.8
9.2
5.0
4.7
0.0
39.5
Non-banking
shocks
(US)
(EA)
6.8
86.9
22.1
64.4
34.2
27.7
7.9
78.0
8.5
81.8
0.1
60.4
Table 6: Variance Decomposition of the Crisis Episode
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Figure 8: Shocks Decomposition of US Output (crisis episode)
at di¤erent times. Consider the parallel with the Asian Crisis of 1997-8; this was triggered by events in
Thailand in July 1997 but no one could say that Thailand caused the Asian Crisissince plainly that
crisis was already brewing across South East Asia for a variety of reasons internal to all the countries
involved. Thus while the Lehman collapse was in this episode clearly a trigger event, this cannot be used
to identify it as the cause of the crisis. Thus our analysis of the various sources of the downturn suggest
that this was not a crisis created by the nancial system.
Plainly in this conclusion we di¤er from other studies of the US and the EAs crisis experience, as
noted in our introduction above. These all nd that banking shocks were the main cause of the crisis.
However, these studies di¤er from ours in two crucial respects: rst, they do not use parameters and
specications that pass any sort of overall empirical test of t to the data behaviour and second, they
do not include shocks drawn from the raw non-stationary data. They also di¤er in not embedding the
models in a world economy which given the spillovers we nd between the two continents may be a
further factor. Le, Meenagh and Minford (2012) found that for the US model the rst two di¤erences
explained the far lower share they, like we, nd for banking shocks. On stationary data and with the
original parameters of SW and BGG banking shocks, they found with essentially the same model as here
for the US that as much as 80% of US output variance for the crisis period is due to banking shocks but
they also found that this drops to only 13% when the empirically-based parameters are used and the
errors are drawn from the raw data. Thus non-stationarity and empirical t are essential to evaluating
the role of banking shocks in the crisis.
4.3 What is and causes a (nancial) crisis?
We now ask: what is a crisis and what causes it, according to our analysis of this sample of US and EA
data? Let us dene a crisisas a severe and highly persistent downturn in output; and a nancial crisis
as a crisis in which nancial indicators show severe distress. We examine this question by inspecting the
bootstrap experience (potential scenarios over the period) from the model. Numerically, we dene two
types of crisis: a) a Great Depressionin which there is a fall in GDP of 10% or more, lasting for 5 years
or more, b) a Great Recessionin which there is a GDP fall of 5% or more lasting 10 quarters or more.
We create 80 such scenarios for the discussion that follows, each 25 years long; thus a total experience
of 2000 years.
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Figure 9: Shocks Decomposition of EA Output (crisis episode)
We nd that:
a) Crises are a normal part of capitalism: this economy will generate crises regularly from stan-
dard shock sequences. We illustrate this- see following graphs- from some of the bootstrap simula-
tions/scenarios produced from the shocks of the period up to 2006 (i.e. sans crisis). In almost all of them
there were quite serious interruptions of activity, which satisfy the denition of crisis. A Great Recession
on average occurred on average every 33 years in the US and every 26 years in the EA.
We also ran the scenarios with the full set of shocks including the crisis period up to 2009; this not
surprisingly produced a somewhat greater average frequency; a Great Recession occurs every 26 years
in the US and every 23 years in the EA. This more or less coincides with post-war experience, in that
there was the severe oil crisis of the 1970s and the recent crisis of the late 2000s.
A Great Depression is a rare event, requiring largescale shocks much as occurred in this crisis episode.
Without such shocks it is exceedingly rare- only happening every 250 years in the US and every 110 years
in the EA. If we include such shocks, it will occur every 156 years in the US, every 68 years in the EA.
Apparently the EA is more crisis-prone.
As for nancial crisis, in some of these crises there were signs of severe nancial distress and so
nancial crisis also occurred; in others nancial problems were muted- we show a selection of each below.
b) We can gauge the importance of nancial crises, ie crises caused by nancial shocks, by examining
scenarios when only nancial shocks occur. We redid these scenarios with just the nancial shocks
including the crisis period values; thus this shock series includes both normal and extreme nancial
shocks. We show three such scenarios in the graphs following (gure 12). For the US we nd that a
Great Recession occurs only once every 543 years, and in the EA every 177 years; one never gets Great
Depressions in either continent. Thus nancial shocks alone cannot cause any sort of crisis in this model
except extremly rarely.
This is broadly in line with what we found in the crisis episode itself: that banking shocks worsen
output uctuations materially but are not their major source.
Here we should emphasise that the extreme nancial shocks in the sample included the e¤ects of mas-
sive government intervention, which occurred largely because of the experience of the Great Depression
when there was no such intervention; thus this particular nding relies crucially on the assumption that
nancial shocks are accompanied by vigorous lender-of-last-resort activity by governments. It is quite
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Figure 10: Crises not Accompanied by Financial Crisis (row1: US; row2: EA)
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Figure 11: Crises Accompanied by Financial Crisis (row1: US; row2: EA)
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Figure 12: Simulations with only Financial Shocks (row1: US; row2 EA)
possible that had we had the inter-war sample of nancial shocks in our data we would have generated
substantially more crises and Great Depressions. So our conclusion here assumes that government is
ready to respond vigorously to large nancial collapses.
5 Conclusions
In this exercise we have examined the origins of the crisis across the US and the EA treated as a world
economy, the rst time this has been done. To do this, we have taken the Smets-Wouters model of
the US and the EA, derived from Christiano et al. (2005), but here in the form as modied by Le et
al.(2011) to allow for more heterogeneity in price/wage behaviour, and we have integrated into it the
banking/nancial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999) in order to discover how far the banking
crisis might have been caused by non-banking and by banking shocks. We began by testing the model
on an original set of parameters largely estimated by SW by Bayesian methods for the two continental
models separately. These were strongly rejected by the data. However, we then re-estimated each model
by Indirect Estimation, thus e¤ectively getting it as close as possible to the data on the indirect inference
test we are using. This version still failed the Wald test badly on a set of seven key macro variables but it
passed comfortably for the two continentsoutputs and did match all these seven variablesvariances. We
would claim that by carefully tting the data behaviour, we have given our results empirical credibility
for the output e¤ects of the crisis, on which we focus our main analysis. Furthermore by using the
original data without ltering, we have been able to extract the total shocks during the crisis period; by
focusing on the total shocks we are able to give full weight to nonstationary shocks, here productivity,
in both continents.
We then used this version to carry out an accounting exercise in the shocks causing the crisis episode.
We did a variance decomposition to establish what a typical crisis generated by these shocks if redrawn
randomly would be caused by. We then looked at the decomposition for this particular episode. Finally
we ran a variety of simulations bootstrapped from di¤erent sets of the shocks in our sample (over the
last three decades, on the grounds that this is of most relevance today) to shed light on the causes of
crisis and banking crisis.
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Our main conclusion is that the banking crisis was largely the result of non-banking shocks impacting
through the usual non-nancial channels on the world economy. The main non-bank shocks to output
were from productivity, labour supply, consumer preferences, and investment shocks. On top of these
banking shocks made a further contribution, for about a third; thus they were material but not domi-
nant. Our conclusion mirrors qualitatively Stock and Watsons (2012) nding from dynamic factor VAR
analysis that the US crisis period was essentially the result of the same set of shocks (of which some were
nancial) as in previous post-war experience, but with bigger values.
We recognise that this di¤ers from the ndings of the others who have done similar exercises; they all
nd that banking shocks were the main cause of the crisis. However, these studies di¤er from ours in two
crucial respects: rst, they do not use parameters and specications that pass empirical tests of overall
t to the data behaviour and second, they do not include shocks drawn from the raw non-stationary
data. These two di¤erences seem to explain our quite di¤erent ndings.
Our second conclusion was that crises are endemic in the world economy largely because of non-
banking shocks; banking shocks contribute to crises but cannot cause crises on their own exept with
extreme rarety. We found that on average a centenarian will live through four Great Recessions and one
Great Depression. Note however that in this sample public policy was highly interventionist whereas it
was not in the Great Depression; thus without such a sharp policy response we would no doubt see more
frequent crises and a greater e¤ect of purely nancial shocks.
The purpose of this study has been to analyse the sources of banking crises such as we have just
experienced. The study comes with caveats: the model cannot match the overall data behaviour of the
world as dened here except for outputs, largely it seems because it cannot match EA data. Nevertheless,
for the US Le, Meenagh and Minford (2012) nd qualitatively similar results, using a shorter sample
from 1984 and a model that does match the key US data behaviour.
In these circumstances what we can say about policy is limited. But one policy conclusion is that
bank regulation seems unlikely to prevent future crises, though it should mitigate them. Therefore its
benets may be more limited than currently thought and should be carefully weighed against its costs
in raising the price of intermediation.
Another conclusion is that if indeed future crises cannot realistically be prevented; thought should be
given to future crisis mitigation by taxpayer responses such as bail-outs. The shocks in this study include
large responses of this sort. We can probably learn from the contrast between crises including these and
crises without them such as in the Great Depression. Costs from moral hazard can be compared with
what may be quite large gains from reduced crisis dimensions.
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6.3 Rest of the World
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6.4 Glossary of Model Variables
ct : Consumption st Real exchange rate
it : Investment imUSt : US imports from EA
yt : Output imEAt : EA imports from US
Qt : Tobins Q imUSW;t : US imports from World
kt : Capital imEAW;t : EA imports from World
lt : Labour exUSW;t : US exports to World
wt : Nomianl wage exEAW;t : EA exports to World
t: : Ination yWt : World production
Rt : Nominal interest rate cWt : World consumption
rext : External premium
rkt : Captial return
cdt : Demestic consumption
cet : Entrepreneurial consumption
nwt : Net worth
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